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Consequences of Public 




For the purposes of this chapter, I defi ne disasters very generally as 
large, sudden, infrequent occurrences that are diffi cult to forecast and 
that result in signifi cant economic loss in the form of output, income, 
property, and life. Particular attention is given to disasters that are geo-
graphically concentrated as opposed to events like global depressions. 
This defi nition is broad enough to cover such disparate events as a re-
gional recession, earthquake, hurricane, drought, oil spill, or terrorist 
attack.
A general approach to disasters has three advantages. First, the 
principle of parsimony holds that it is desirable to explain as many 
phenomena as possible with a single theory. Second, generality allows 
results developed for one type of disaster event to inform our think-
ing about the economic effects of other disaster types.1 Third, models 
that claim to explain the effects of many different types of disasters are 
much easier to refute than those with few testable implications or with 
narrow predictive power. Theories that are easily refuted should inspire 
the strongest beliefs in other theories where there is an absence of suc-
cessful refutation. Put another way, if someone advances a theory of the 
effects of Hurricane Katrina and claims that it is uniquely appropriate 
for the U.S. Gulf Coast, the theory is not likely to be generally useful 
and, because it is based on a single data point, its ability to account for 
the effects does not indicate that the fi ndings on which it is based are 
statistically signifi cant.
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Literature on the economic effects of disasters concentrates on mea-
sures of direct and indirect effects. Direct effects are losses associated 
with observable damage to property, production, and persons. Indirect 
effects are costs of recovery and mitigation efforts. Indirect costs are 
more diffi cult to observe but can be and have been well measured. This 
chapter concerns itself with effects that arise through changes in ex-
pectations. Direct observation of expectations is generally either not 
possible, too expensive, or not precise. Accordingly, expectations mod-
els must generate a number of implications that can provide indirect 
validation of the underlying theory.
Three disaster expectations models are examined in this paper. First, 
and most direct, is the effect of disaster expectations on local property 
values and economic development. Particular attention is given to the 
possibility that recent disaster experience changes local disaster expec-
tations. This model implies that economic effects of disaster events are 
based on the unanticipated component of disaster events, or on the dif-
ference between actual and expected disaster losses. Second, the effect 
of disaster expectations on incentives to develop land is considered. 
Using models taken from urban economics, it is possible to demon-
strate circumstances under which private returns from development of 
land in hazard-prone areas are less than social returns. Third, disaster 
expectations of property owners should include not only direct damage 
to their own assets but also the possibility of asset revaluation due to 
the external effects of disasters on surrounding property. The fi ndings 
demonstrate that expectations regarding these external effects make 
disaster insurance different from other forms of hazard insurance and 
explain some puzzles about behavior of property owners in disaster-
prone areas.
The next four sections of the chapter discuss these three models 
of disaster expectations (the direct effect of disaster expectations is 
analyzed in two sections). The fi nal section summarizes the major fi nd-
ings and develops implications of these models for understanding the 
likely effects of changes in public policy toward natural and man-made 
disasters.
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INDIVIDUAL AND MARKET RESPONSES TO
DISASTER EXPECTATIONS
There is ample evidence that disaster expectations are priced into 
markets. The most obvious example is insurance against disaster events, 
where pricing is based on sophisticated models of the likelihood that 
events will occur and the estimate of damage, conditional on the event 
happening. Those insurance companies that do not price insurance and 
accumulate reserves using statistical models of disaster expectations do 
not remain solvent for long and can generally be dismissed as curiosi-
ties that have no long-term importance.2
There is a strong argument that competitive pressures force most 
fi rms to form and act upon effi cient disaster expectations, because they 
must purchase hazard insurance in order to secure capital investment. 
However, the case for household responses to disaster expectations is 
not so obvious. Indeed, there is evidence that households are reluctant 
to purchase insurance against disaster events even when the insurance 
is subsidized. Before discussing models that trace the effect of disasters 
on the economy through their effect on disaster expectations, it is worth 
reviewing the evidence on household responses to disaster expectations.
Because disasters are infrequent and diffi cult to forecast, households 
will have diffi culty forming expectations regarding their likelihood and 
severity. However, the literature on individual responses to other large, 
low-frequency hazards appears to conclude that the implied value of 
life based on household mitigation behavior is consistent and not unrea-
sonable.3 This suggests that households may have reasonable disaster 
expectations. Shilling, Benjamin, and Sirmans (1985) fi nd that house-
holds, confronted with different hazard insurance rates associated with 
location within or near a fl oodplain, require a compensating differential 
in housing prices to live in areas where the expected cost of fl ood dam-
age is larger. MacDonald, Murdoch, and White (1987) carry the analysis 
further by modeling the relation between house price discounts and the 
discounted present value of future insurance payments and conclude 
that, at reasonable discount rates, housing price differentials refl ect dif-
ferences in expected future insurance premiums.
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Thus far the evidence discussed deals with cases in which static 
differences in disaster expectations infl uence household behavior. 
Research has also been done on the effects of changes in disaster ex-
pectations due to the provision of expert information. Brookshire et al. 
(1985) examined the effects on housing prices of the requirement that 
home sellers in California reveal proximity of the housing unit to earth-
quake fault lines. The regulation was passed based on the belief that this 
information was not available to buyers. The natural experiment, with 
observations before and after the information and for houses in and out 
of the fault areas, indicated that the proximity to the fault line affected 
price after the announcement was made.4
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the economic ef-
fects of disaster information was the response to federal government 
notices of earthquake hazards in the resort community of Mammoth 
Lakes, California, from 1980 until 1984. The unique feature of this 
incident was that the United States Geological Survey (USGS) recog-
nized that making public announcements of changes in the probability 
of seismic events could have serious consequences and implemented 
an experimental design around the pronouncements. The USGS ad-
opted a three-level index of potential hazard and, from 1980 to 1984, 
announced seismic risks for Mammoth Lakes that began with the low-
est and ended at the highest risk level. The results of this experiment, 
as reported in a detailed study by Bernknopf, Brookshire, and Thayer 
(1990), were dramatic. Surveys of the resident population showed that 
there was a substantial increase in perceptions that a seismic event was 
likely after each announcement of increasing risk. Recreational use of 
the area did not fall. However, new construction and house values fell 
signifi cantly. The market response was so dramatic that the USGS de-
cided to abandon its three-level seismic hazard announcement policy.5
Overall, there is substantial empirical evidence that fi rms and 
households have signifi cant market responses to information on the 
likelihood of hazard events, whether that information is presented in 
the form of insurance rates or government announcements. This should 
not come as a surprise, and the economic effects of these reactions 
are easily understood and consistent with economic effi ciency. When 
increased hazard expectations are capitalized into the asset price of 
real property, construction in hazard-prone areas is discouraged and 
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property owners have an incentive to adopt designs that mitigate the 
likely damage should a disaster occur. All this is unsurprising and well 
established in the literature. Indeed, there is nothing in the foregoing 
discussion that distinguishes market reactions to disasters from the eco-
nomics of hazards generally.
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
DISASTER EXPECTATIONS
Because disasters are infrequent, large, spatially concentrated, and 
diffi cult to forecast, there is a possibility that disaster events change 
disaster expectations, and, of course, that failure to experience disasters 
changes expectations in the opposite direction. This is a distinguishing 
characteristic of disasters.
Hazards that are not infrequent, large, spatially concentrated, or dif-
fi cult to forecast have expectations that are not signifi cantly infl uenced 
by individual hazard events. The fact that a house in a neighborhood 
burns down has zero effect on insurance models or public expectations 
of fi re damage hazards. This is true because home fi res are frequent, im-
pose modest losses, are not spatially concentrated, and can be forecast 
with great precision. Individual occurrences of an event that is fairly 
likely to happen have little effect on the expected probability of that 
event.
Because disasters are infrequent and diffi cult to forecast, fi rms and 
individuals should use recent history to update their expectations of the 
stochastic process generating the disasters. This was very evident in the 
reaction to hurricane losses in Florida during the 1990s when property 
insurance companies raised rates or withdrew from the market, neces-
sitating the formation of a government-sponsored Florida Hurricane 
Catastrophe Fund. This is one of many examples in which it appears 
evident that an increase in the frequency or extent of disaster events 
causes insurance companies to modify stochastic models of disaster 
loss and substantially raise insurance premiums. The natural presump-
tion is that fi rms and households behave similarly and that in addition 
to the direct and indirect effects of disasters, disaster events have an 
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expectations effect due to the consequences of the modifi ed estimates of 
disaster losses. Such effects might well have negative implications for 
recovery and growth of income, output, population, and so on.
There is contradictory evidence regarding the effect of disasters 
on expectations based on the relation between disaster experience and 
economic development. In a very infl uential statistical analysis of di-
saster events, Wright et al. (1979) concludes that the rates of growth are 
higher after disasters than before and that long-run growth is higher in 
areas that experience disaster events. An extensive literature has com-
pared economic outcomes in areas with and without disaster events. 
Most recently, Belasen and Polacheck (2008) apply a generalized dif-
ference in difference estimator to counties in Florida over the 1988 to 
2005 period, when the state experienced 19 major storms. They fi nd 
that employment fell by about 4.8 percent and total earnings rose 4.4 
percent in counties experiencing direct hits, while total earnings fell 4.5 
percent in neighboring counties. These differences dissipate over time. 
Studying international disasters, Cuaresma, Hlouskova, and Obersteiner 
(2008) fi nd evidence that countries with higher disaster rates experi-
ence higher rates of subsequent economic growth.6 Further evidence 
presented by Worthington (2008) indicates that natural disaster events 
have no signifi cant effects on overall stock market returns. These and a 
large number of other statistical studies of cross-section and panel data 
on areas with and without disaster events tend to produce evidence that 
disasters are not associated with signifi cant negative effects on output, 
earnings, and employment. One or more of these variables may decline, 
but the type of general negative implication for economic growth that 
would be expected from an upward revision in disaster expectations has 
not been observed.
There is a parallel literature consisting of case studies conducted in 
the aftermath of disasters. Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) contend that the 
rush of aid in response to the great Alaskan earthquake of 1964 gave an 
area in long-term decline a chance to reverse its falling employment. 
Other case studies have reached similar conclusions. Recently Smith 
et al. (2006) found that the recovery pattern from Hurricane Andrew 
varied by income group, with the numbers of high- and low-income 
households growing in the aftermath of the storm while the number of 
middle-income households fell. While case studies of the aftermath of 
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Katrina are not available yet, it appears certain that income, output, and 
employment will not recover. Still, the general sense of the literature 
reviewed above is that the answer to the question, “Are disasters bad 
for economic growth?” could be “no” or at least “not necessarily.” This 
leads to the subsequent question, “Is postdisaster relief too generous?”
There is a problem with both of these questions as well as the pro-
posed answer. Understanding the problem and formulating an answer 
will require development of a formal model of the likely effects of 
changed disaster expectations on economic growth. The model begins 
with an understanding of real estate values in an urban land market. 
Because real estate is immobile, differences in future expectations for 
regional economic activity tend to be capitalized in land and housing 
values. There is a well-developed literature on quality of life stemming 
from the work of Rosen (1974) and Roback (1982, 1988) that suggests 
a relation among amenity, house prices, and wages in a labor market 
area. Decreases in amenity are associated with increases in wages and 
decreased house prices in order to keep households from leaving an 
area. A rise in disaster expectations makes an area less attractive to both 
fi rms and households. Under these circumstances the change in wages 
is ambiguous because there is a spatial no-arbitrage condition for fi rms 
based on profi ts and for households based on indirect utility.7 However, 
the theory unambiguously predicts that land and real estate prices will 
fall in response to an increase in disaster expectations.
Rubin and Yezer (1987) provide a general empirical test of the rela-
tion between disaster events and local economic activity by examining 
the change in house prices in areas experiencing different numbers of 
disasters. For a panel of U.S. cities in 1983, they analyzed the partial 
effect on the asset prices of housing, as reported in the American Hous-
ing Survey for a cross-section of cities, in relation to differences in the 
number of disaster events during the previous 20 years.8 The estimated 
coeffi cient of disasters was positive, and its magnitude implied that go-
ing from an annual disaster rate of zero to one increased the value of 
owner-occupied housing in the city by 26 percent.9 The authors point 
out that such an interpretation of the estimated coeffi cient of disasters is 
absurd, and they argue from these results that something is very wrong 
with models that relate the incidence of disaster events to local eco-
nomic development.
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The literature has documented the effects of information from in-
surance pricing, scientifi c evidence, and government pronouncements 
on disaster expectations. It is much more diffi cult to determine the ef-
fect of disasters themselves on disaster expectations. This is perhaps the 
most underresearched aspect of the economics of disasters. A disaster 
event might lower, raise, or leave unchanged disaster expectations of a 
rational agent, depending on the nature of the disaster. Some seismic 
events occur periodically and, given the slow pace of geologic time, 
an eruption today may mean that the next eruption is hundreds of years 
in the future. Alternatively, recent storm damage may lead individuals 
to expect that the underlying frequency of storms has increased due to 
global climate change.
This paper is particularly concerned with the case in which, given 
the complexity or lack of information on the process generating the 
disaster, agents update their expectations of the frequency distribution 
of disasters based on a comparison of recent disaster experience with 
the historical record. Such updating may occur for two reasons. First, 
individuals may believe that the disaster-generating process varies over 
time and may be trying to estimate the parameters of a stochastic process 
with drift.10 Alternatively, they may believe that disasters are generated 
by a stationary stochastic process and simply use recent experience to 
improve their estimates of the parameters of that distribution. Because 
this second case is easier to describe and has been analyzed in the litera-
ture, it will be considered in some detail here.
In considering the case of a stable stochastic process, the Poisson 
process is quite attractive because it requires individuals to estimate a 
single parameter, and the probability of a disaster event is independent 
of the time since the last disaster. Cox and Lewis (1966) fi rst suggested 
fi tting the Poisson process to disaster events, and Brown (1972) adapted 
it to the case of fl ooding. Analysis of Bayesian updating of expecta-
tions regarding the Poisson process is mercifully simple. The process 
is based on a single parameter: the expected disaster frequency, f. The 
expected time between disasters, T, is the reciprocal of f; that is, T = 
1/f. Assume that the historical record available at time t indicates that 
α disasters were observed over the previous τ years. Then the estimate 
of f at time t is simply the ratio ft = α / τ. Now assume that, in the next X years, β additional disasters occur. Then the Bayesian estimate of f at 
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time t + X is ft + X = (α + β) / (τ + X). The change in estimated disaster 
frequency between t and t + X is given by
This fi nal expression has a very intuitive interpretation. The change 
in expected disaster frequency is equal to the difference between actual 
disaster experience during the recent period of X years, β, and expected 
number of disasters based on the previous τ years, α(X / τ), divided by 
the total number of years under consideration, X + τ. Thus this change 
represents the difference between actual and expected disasters per year 
of disaster history available to the individual making the estimate.
Rubin and Yezer (1987) discuss whether the difference between ac-
tual and expected disasters could help explain the more rapid increase 
in house prices in cities that had more disasters. Dividing the 20-year 
period over which presidential disaster declarations were observed in 
their cross-section of cities into a 16-year “history” that served as the 
basis for estimates of disaster expectations and a subsequent 4 years of 
recent experience, they computed the difference between the number of 
actual and expected disasters in the recent period and reestimated the 
model of house price change discussed above. The disaster rate for the 
entire period still had a positive sign, but the difference between actual 
and expected disasters (i.e., the number of unexpected disasters) had a 
substantial negative effect on house values.
How should these results be interpreted? It appears that during this 
period, cities where disaster expectations were higher were growing 
faster than those where disaster expectations were lower. Given that cit-
ies with higher disaster expectations have more disasters, this produced 
a positive association between house price growth and the disaster rate. 
This association is of no particular signifi cance unless there is further 
evidence that the growth of cities in areas with higher disaster rates is 
being subsidized. Put another way, the literature on the relation between 
area economic growth and disaster frequency does not reveal the effects 
of disasters on growth because most disasters are anticipated. Develop-
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ment takes place in high-disaster areas only in anticipation of future 
damage, and that expected damage is part of the cost of doing business 
in those areas. “What is the effect of disasters on economic growth?” 
is a vexed question. The appropriate question is, “What is the effect of 
unanticipated disasters on economic growth?”
The effect of unanticipated disasters on house values found by 
Rubin and Yezer (1987) is substantial. Consider an area that had no 
previous disaster experience and then had one disaster during the four-
year event window; that is, it had one unanticipated disaster. This would 
lower house values by 2 percent. This change may not seem large; how-
ever, in a city with 500,000 housing units with an average value of 
$200,000, the change in expectations due to the single unanticipated 
disaster event lowers total house values by $2 billion! This is only one 
example of how the effects of unanticipated disasters can be large com-
pared to the direct damage and indirect recovery costs.
The implications for public policy of these substantial effects on 
local economies of changes in disaster expectations based on disas-
ter events will be discussed in some detail in a subsequent section. It 
should be clear that disasters that have the same direct and indirect ef-
fects in terms of damages to property, income, output, and individuals 
have very different long-term local effects depending on the extent to 
which they were anticipated. Furthermore, while it is possible, at least 
in theory if not in practice, to insure against direct and even some indi-
rect losses due to disaster events, insuring against losses due to changed 
expectations is impossible. Indeed, it is likely that fi rms and households 
in areas with high disaster expectations are well insured against direct 
and indirect losses, whereas those in areas where expectations are low 
are unlikely to insure against these insurable losses. Thus the overall 
uninsured losses from unanticipated disasters are likely to be very large. 
It should also be obvious that the economic effects of man-made di-
sasters, particularly acts of terrorism, are best understood in terms of 
changes in expectations.11 Other things being equal, those terrorist acts 
that produce damages of a type or in a location where expectations were 
low have the largest economic effects. These considerations will prove 
very important in the discussion of policy implications.
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Disaster Expectations and Effi cient Land Use and Mitigation
Most of the literature on disaster expectations and effi cient eco-
nomic development deals with excess development and insuffi cient 
mitigation efforts in areas where disaster frequencies are high. This 
problem has been the object of congressional testimony and reports as 
well as academic inquiry.12 Once disaster relief became a regular and 
mandated part of federal policy, there was an incentive for states, lo-
calities, and individuals to self-insure development in hazardous areas. 
The normal disincentives to such development—namely, the prospect 
of loss and the cost of insurance—were mitigated by the prospect of 
postdisaster relief.13 Concern over this problem has led to a number 
of initiatives, including the National Flood Insurance Program, which 
dealt with excess development and inadequate mitigation by combining 
disaster relief provisions with mandatory insurance and design require-
ments. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 promoted state 
and local planning efforts to control and direct development, and the 
Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982 attempted to deter development 
by cutting off federal funding to designated areas that had high disaster 
probability and environmental sensitivity.
The general sense of the literature appears to be that government 
policy for disaster relief is subject to the Samaritan’s dilemma: these 
efforts create major problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and 
time inconsistency that encourage development and discourage miti-
gation in disaster-prone areas.14 Mandatory insurance, design controls, 
mandatory mitigation, and even designation of areas in which govern-
ment assistance will not be provided are generally seen as the proper 
response to the distortions produced by disaster relief programs.
This section focuses on an issue that has attracted negligible inter-
est in the literature: spatial land market models suggesting that there is 
too little development in areas where disaster expectations are high. The 
overdevelopment literature discussed above tends to ignore issues of 
space and location that are governed by the functioning of the land mar-
ket. Because land subject to high disaster risk is spatially concentrated, 
the development of signifi cant areas is contingent on the treatment of 
disaster losses. Frame (1998, 2001) has considered this issue explicitly, 
as follows. Take the land market in a standard urban model in which 
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land at a particular location has special value based on unique locational 
advantages, such as the central business district of a city or a shoreline 
location. For simplicity’s sake call this the high-productivity area. Land 
rents will peak at such points and decline with distance. What happens 
if some of the land at or near the peak of this land rent surface is not 
developed because it is subject to fl ooding or some other hazard that 
would infl ict substantial damage on real property? Frame demonstrates 
that this undeveloped land yields a general loss of community welfare 
because the area as a whole is less effi cient at providing developed sites 
with access to the high-productivity area. This result holds even if the 
high-hazard area does not impede through access; for example, if the 
area lacks housing but highways can be built through it to transport 
workers or consumers from distant points to the high-productivity area.
More recently Liu (2008) has examined the relation between the 
private and social returns from developing land in and around high-
productivity areas. The private gain from developing land in hazardous 
areas is the difference in value between undeveloped and developed 
land. Part of the development process is the opportunity for mitigation, 
and the assumption is that insurance markets are available or that de-
velopers are risk-neutral. His results are quite intuitive. If there are no 
externalities associated with the functioning of a perfectly competitive 
land market, private benefi t from development of land subject to haz-
ards is equal to the social benefi t, and private land market allocations are 
socially effi cient. However, if there are externalities in the operation of 
the land market, particularly problems of traffi c congestion, social ben-
efi t can be signifi cantly larger than private benefi t. Using a numerical 
urban simulation model with congestion calibrated to Kansas City, Liu 
fi nds that the social value of development near central city areas is ap-
proximately twice the private benefi t realized by the land owner.15 This 
means that land subject to hazards could have too little development. 
McDonald (2009), in a similar model calibrated to Chicago, confi rms 
the general result that, in the presence of congestion, private benefi ts to 
development of land near the central business district are signifi cantly 
below social benefi ts. While he does not relate these results to effects of 
hazards, the arguments made here would hold in his model also.16
Nothing in this discussion of the land market models and the pos-
sibility of underdevelopment of high disaster risk areas should be seen 
yezer.indd   50 5/25/2010   1:58:24 PM
Public Policy toward Natural and Man-Made Disasters   51
as a contradiction of the literature on incentives for excess development 
due to moral hazard arising from federal disaster relief programs.17 
However, land market effi ciency considerations do suggest that, in 
some circumstances, there are countervailing forces that tend to restrict 
development below optimal levels in areas that are prone to disasters. 
Accordingly, such areas should be given careful attention to determine 
which of the confl icting forces is larger.
Disaster Expectations, External Effects, and Disaster Insurance
One puzzle in the disaster literature involves the reluctance of 
households in high-risk areas to purchase insurance even if the price 
appears to be below expected losses. The failure to use subsidized in-
surance has troubled many observers. Kunreuther (1978) noted that, 
in the fi rst four years of the National Flood Insurance Program (1968–
1972), only 3,000 of 21,000 eligible communities with substantial 
fl ooding history participated in the program, and fewer than 300,000 
homeowners voluntarily purchased a policy. Even though the NFIP was 
subsidized, participation was initially achieved only by threatening to 
withhold federally assisted or guaranteed construction from nonpartici-
pating communities, and by denying mortgage loans to property owners 
in nonparticipating communities that were identifi ed as special fl ood 
hazard areas.18 Palm et al. (1990) documented a similar failure of home-
owners and mortgage lenders to seek earthquake insurance in high-risk 
areas. Kunreuther and Kleffner (1992) and Kunreuther (1996) have 
even argued that homeowners do not behave as if they are maximizing 
expected utility in their decisions to purchase insurance or engage in 
private mitigation efforts.
The discussion of disaster insurance is generally conducted using 
models standard in the insurance literature. A household owns an asset 
whose current value is A which is subject to expected damages of DA 
so that its expected value in the next period is A − DA with variance VD. 
The variance in A − DA is due to the possibility that the hazard event 
might occur during the current time period. Given that the expected 
value of damage due to the hazard is generally known to be DA, the 
household can purchase hazard insurance at a price of DA + F, where 
F is the normal fee associated with providing this insurance product 
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under perfect competition. Households have a choice of purchasing full 
insurance or no insurance. What are the consequences for wealth in the 
next period? Expected wealth under full insurance is A − (DA + F), with 
certainty compared to expected wealth of A − DA with variance VD with-
out insurance. Insurance reduces the variance in return to zero because 
the insurance payment is perfectly correlated with the damage to asset 
value. Households that are moderately risk averse will choose insur-
ance, and there is no reason to assume that households owning property 
in disaster-prone areas are not moderately risk averse.19 This line of 
argument has treated disaster risk the same as other risks to property, 
such as fi re, liability, collision, or theft.
One distinguishing characteristic of disasters, as defi ned in this es-
say, is the extent and spatial concentration of damage. In terms of the 
simple example above, any damage to asset value A is likely associated 
with damage experienced by the full alphabet of asset values owned by 
other households in the area. In this case, the fall in wealth experienced 
by the household is equal to A − (DA + EA ), where EA is the external ef-
fect of disaster damage to other properties in the area on the value of the 
asset. Assume that VE and rED are the variance of E and the correlation 
between E and D respectively. A household that purchases insurance 
has expected wealth of A − (DA + F + EA ) with variance VE , and the 
household that self-insures has expected wealth of A − (DA+ EA ) and 
variance of (VD + VE )/2 + rED (VEVD )
0.5. The variance in second-period 
wealth of those who purchase insurance depends crucially on rED. Con-
sider the stylized but not unreasonable case in which VD is equal to VE 
and rED equals one, so that the external damage is perfectly correlated 
with the damage to the structure. Then the variance becomes 2VD and 
the risk of self-insuring has doubled. In this case, the household has the 
choice between two risky alternatives but, again abstracting for other 
opportunities for risk diversifi cation, the moderately risk-averse house-
hold is likely to have a risk premium greater than F and will choose to 
purchase insurance. Now consider the other extreme, in which VD is 
equal to VE and rED equals −1. The household that self-insures has ex-
pected second-period wealth of A − (DA + EA ) and variance of zero. This 
household thus will rationally self-insure unless insurance is heavily 
subsidized. Indeed, there is a separating equilibrium for rED suffi ciently 
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small that even very risk-averse households switch from buying to not 
buying insurance.
The incentive to purchase insurance and the effects of mandatory 
insurance depend on the relative sizes of DA and EA and particularly on 
the sign and size of rED. Given that the indirect effects of disasters take 
the form of a local public good, it may appear that this correlation is 
positive and close to one. However, one line of argument suggests rED 
is negative. If a structure is damaged but the damage is less than that of 
surrounding structures, then the rental price of its services may well rise 
because the disaster reduces the supply of real property for a signifi cant 
period after the event. Furthermore, the reduction in real property may 
be permanent.
Perhaps the most obvious case for a negative rED is that of beach 
property located in the third or fourth row of homes from the shoreline. 
In most beach communities, there is a sharp decline in value as distance 
from the shoreline increases: that is, value varies inversely with row. In 
storm events, most damage is experienced by the fi rst and second rows. 
In some cases, the fi rst row cannot be rebuilt due to shoreline erosion, 
and each subsequent row then moves up the value gradient. Put another 
way, the third row is one large hurricane away from being beachfront 
property.
This simple model illustrates that, if there are signifi cant external 
effects that are negatively correlated with private damages, the effect of 
insurance on economic development becomes rather complex. As noted 
above, many property owners will fail to insure even if insurance pric-
ing is based on shared expectations of future damages. The provision of 
such insurance benefi ts those owners whose expected external effects 
are either small or positively correlated with private damages. It does 
not benefi t owners with large external effects that are negatively cor-
related with damages. Therefore, mandating disaster insurance for all 
property owners imposes net costs on owners of properties with signifi -
cant external effects that are negatively correlated with damages. This 
leads to the surprising result that mandatory purchase requirements for 
insurance that is priced based on expected damages distorts asset prices 
and property development by lowering asset prices for properties with 
large external effects that are negatively correlated with damages.
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The example noted of beach property in different rows may offer a 
test of the theoretical arguments made above. The nature of external ef-
fects should vary signifi cantly with distance from the shoreline. Given 
that the hazard is storm damage by wind and waves, it is likely that 
private damage in the fi rst row will be much larger than any external 
effects and that external effects will be positively correlated with dam-
ages.20 Moving back to the second and third rows of property, these 
relative effects are likely to be reversed. Shoreline erosion may imperil 
the fi rst row, but it simply makes inland areas more proximate to the 
beach. Damages to interior areas are very likely to be smaller than in 
the fi rst row. Overall it appears that shoreline areas provide an excellent 
natural experiment to assess the varying importance of private damages 
versus external effects for economic activity.
The diffi culty with testing the effects of private damage and external 
effects on investment in beach property is that the test requires differ-
entiating among rows of beach development: that is, the geographic 
scale is very small. Testing for insurance effects is further complicated 
because the current NFIP has been in place in most beach communities 
since the mid-1980s, so insurance coverage has not varied signifi cantly 
in recent years. The most direct way to measure effects of insurance 
coverage is to look for capitalization in asset prices by monitoring the 
variation in house values by row and over time. Some research on the 
effects of government policy on beachfront residential development 
has been done using hedonic house value equations (Keeler, Kriesel, 
and Landry 2003), repeat sale house price indexes (Cordes, Gatzlaff, 
and Yezer 2001), and building permits issued (Cordes and Yezer 1998). 
Unfortunately, none of these techniques is suitable for tracking devel-
opment effects on shoreline property based on distance in feet from the 
water’s edge in beach communities over the period extending from be-
fore the NFIP through its current form. Such an analysis would require 
price or permit data going back to 1968 differentiated by row from the 
shoreline. No such data are available.
Cordes, Yezer, and Asadurian (2008) found another way to test 
for the differential effects of fl ood insurance by row from the beach-
front. Property records include the number of square feet of interior 
space of dwellings and the date that the housing was built. Using aerial 
photographic maps, they were able to divide beach developments into 
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rectangles corresponding to development rows whose land area is fi xed 
and measurable. Using building records that gave the number of square 
feet of interior space in each dwelling in a rectangle, it was possible to 
construct a time series going back to 1968 of the square feet of interior 
space per square foot of land area, commonly known as the “fl oor/area 
ratio.” The result of this effort was a 40-year time series of the capital/
land ratio in each rectangle for the period from 1968 to 1997. The maps 
also facilitated calculation of distance of each row from the water’s 
edge and, together with information on erosion rates, this allowed com-
putation of estimated time until erosion undermined the structures in a 
given rectangle.21
Each beachfront community entered into the NFIP in two stages. 
First it entered the emergency program, where fl ood insurance was 
heavily subsidized, and then, after completion of a fl ood insurance map 
(FIRM), it entered the regular program, in which insurance subsidies 
for new construction were much smaller or nonexistent.22 Given that 
the various communities entered these two phases in different years, 
the data include observations of communities with and without each 
of the programs in any given year as well as before and after infor-
mation for each community. The estimation results demonstrated that 
entering both the emergency and regular NFIP had the effect of tilting 
real property development toward the shoreline. The rate of growth in 
density, measured as fl oor/area ratio, increased the most in the fi rst row, 
but this positive effect fell off rapidly, reaching zero at a distance of 
350 feet from the water’s edge. The effect was large, statistically sig-
nifi cant, and congruent with the theoretical prediction that programs 
mandating insurance encourage development in areas where the exter-
nal effects of hazards are negligible or positively correlated with the 
private damage—the fi rst rows of shoreline development. At the same 
time, mandatory insurance programs discourage development in areas 
where the external effects of hazards are large or negatively correlated 
with private damage—rows located inland.
Thus it appears that the existence of expectations that disasters 
are associated with both private damage and external effects creates 
the paradoxical possibility that mandating universal purchase of insur-
ance based on expected private damage estimates distorts the location 
of economic activity toward areas where expected hazard losses are 
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higher. While this may appear counterintuitive, it does explain the dif-
fi culty in getting some households in high-risk areas to participate in 
the NFIP.
IMPLICATIONS OF DISASTER EXPECTATIONS
FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Formal models of the economic effects of natural and man-made 
disasters should include careful modeling of expectations, because 
the prior level of disaster expectations, and any resulting changes in 
the expectations, are very important determinants of those economic 
effects. This essay has developed some of the pathways relating expec-
tations and economic effects, but other important linkages in need of 
research may exist. Nevertheless, the analysis presented here is suffi -
cient to demonstrate some important principles whose implications for 
public policy toward disasters will be discussed, including the effects 
of changed disaster expectations, effi cient land use considerations, and 
potential distortions due to mandated insurance and mitigation.
Changes in Disaster Expectations
The economic effects of disasters depend on the relation between 
prior expectations and actual disaster experience. This is illustrated in 
the literature on the effects of earthquakes on property values and di-
saster expectations. Beron et al. (1997) fi nd that property values near 
fault lines actually rose after the Loma Prieta earthquake and argue that 
prior expectations were too high. In contrast, Naoi, Seko, and Sumita 
(2009) report that for earthquakes in Japan, surveys show that quake 
expectations double after an event and property values fall signifi cantly. 
If actual disasters refl ect disaster expectations, then those expectations 
will be unchanged and negative expectations’ effects on economic de-
velopment should be minor. The economic effects of a disaster depend 
not only on how much damage it does but also the extent to which the 
disaster event and the associated damage were anticipated. Furthermore, 
it is not possible for fi rms and households to insure against the eco-
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nomic losses associated with changed expectations after unanticipated 
disasters. What does this imply for public policy? First, it suggests that 
insurance markets are inherently incomplete and that there is a role for 
postdisaster aid. However, the aid should be focused on areas experi-
encing unanticipated disaster events.
While such selective targeting of disaster relief to unanticipated di-
sasters is likely politically impossible, some elements of disaster relief 
policy seem consistent with a focus on events that raise expectations. 
First, there is a scale effect in disaster declarations, so larger disasters 
get proportionally greater postdisaster compensation.23 To the extent 
that unusually large disaster events are unanticipated, making federal 
participation a nonlinear function of the size of the aggregate losses is 
appropriate. Furthermore, NFIP aid diminishes for repeated fl ooding 
events. The subsidized insurance for grandfathered structures can be 
withdrawn after repeated losses. Finally, the amount of publicity and 
attention given to disaster events may decrease to the extent that the 
event is regular and anticipated. This may lower the amount of public 
and private aid following such events. Certainly, more could be done 
with formal policies toward postdisaster aid to concentrate public funds 
on unanticipated disaster events, but in this case political expediency 
likely will triumph over economic logic.
Another implication of the losses associated with unanticipated 
disasters is that terrorists who wish to infl ict maximum total damage 
for a given amount of physical damage will concentrate their actions 
where damage is not anticipated. There are many other considerations in 
selecting targets, but areas where disaster expectations are low have two 
advantages. First, victims will likely not be taking precautions. This 
makes success in infl icting damage more likely, and perhaps also lowers 
the probability of apprehension and sanction if that is a consideration. 
Second, the unexpected component of the disaster event is largest in 
areas where prior expectations are lowest. In this case the implications 
for public policy are clear and, fortunately, the politically expedient 
course does not tend toward moral hazard. Provision of generous relief 
from damages lowers the expectation of loss from man-made disasters. 
This lowers the economic effects because the economic reaction will 
depend both on the change in expectations of the probability of loss and 
on the expectation of the size of loss conditional on the act taking place. 
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Relief can do nothing about the change in probability, but it can lower 
the conditional expectation of loss and hence the economic effects pro-
duced by the change in expectations.24
Incentives for Effi cient Land Use and Mitigation
The moral hazard and time inconsistency problems associated with 
federal provision of disaster relief are well understood.25 Indeed, the 
cornerstone of disaster policy since the passage of NFIP has been to re-
solve the Samaritan’s dilemma by forcing those developing property in 
hazardous areas to face an insurance price that refl ects expected future 
losses and required mitigation to control those losses. Insurance and 
mitigation costs, in turn, discourage development.
Because hazards are spatially concentrated, public policy toward 
disasters has an important effect on when and how densely signifi cant 
tracts of land are developed. When this issue is considered in terms of a 
continuous land market model, it is important that the private incentives 
to develop land in hazardous areas be consistent with the social benefi ts 
from such development. If land is homogenous, private benefi t equals 
social benefi t and private landlords should develop land only when the 
private returns to development are suffi cient to compensate for the cost 
of development, including any expected disaster losses. However, all 
land is not homogenous, and there may well be externalities associated 
with land development, particularly in an urban setting where acces-
sibility is important and transportation systems are congested. Under 
such circumstances the social benefi t from developing sites may exceed 
the private benefi t, and landlords may fail to develop land or may do so 
at a density that is below the social optimum. In these circumstances, 
public action to subsidize mitigation or insurance can be justifi ed.
There are many examples of public policy efforts to subsidize 
development of hazard-prone land in an urban context. Many com-
munities have used general public funding for fl ood control and land 
reclamation efforts.26 The arguments made in this essay suggest that 
there is an economic rationale for these actions and that public subsidy 
calls for a demonstration of social benefi ts in excess of private benefi ts. 
In cases where subsidized mitigation is not feasible or not economical, 
provision of subsidized insurance can also align private and social ben-
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efi ts from development. Such policies must be implemented with some 
care, because political abuse by subsidizing development where there is 
no externality is also possible.
External Effects and Disaster Insurance
Because disaster effects are spatially concentrated, the usual insur-
ance model should be applied cautiously in developing the economic 
effects of disaster insurance. When disaster strikes, owners of prop-
erty suffer private damage and insurance compensates for those losses. 
Insurance is also available for some of the disruption following the 
disaster—that is, for the indirect effects of the disaster. It is easy to con-
struct an argument for mandatory participation in an actuarially sound 
disaster insurance program, particularly when the government is com-
mitted to providing relief services.
This argument ignores external effects of disasters on asset prices 
in an area. One can easily identify situations in which these external ef-
fects are positive and offset the private losses. This explains why some 
property owners in hazardous areas rationally fail to purchase hazard 
insurance, even when the insurance is subsidized. Public policies that 
mandate purchase of actuarially fair insurance in such cases will distort 
the pattern of economic development toward areas where expected pri-
vate losses are high compared to any external effects. These may well 
be the areas where disaster damage expectations are highest. The end 
result could be to encourage the movement of economic development 
into harm’s way.
This does not mean that it is necessary to abandon public policies 
of mandating the purchase of disaster insurance. It does suggest that 
the case for mandating purchase should be very strong. In such cases, 
it should be possible to provide insurance at rates that are higher than 
actuarially fair in areas where external effects are positively correlated 
with private losses and at a discount to fair rates where external effects 
are negatively correlated with private losses. Identifi cation of these 
areas need not involve substantial economic analysis: they should be 
apparent based on patterns of participation in voluntary insurance pro-
grams or even in our current “mandated” programs by observing areas 
where actual participation rates are either very high or very low.
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Overall, models that integrate expectations of natural and man-
made disasters into the body of economic theory suggest that public 
policy toward these events needs to be carefully considered. The great 
diffi culty facing the federal government is the general presumption that 
programs and policies need to be nationally uniform. Considerations of 
economic effi ciency appear to run counter to this presumption.
Notes
1. There is currently a national need to understand the effects of terrorist events. In 
the absence of the ability to extend results from other types of disasters to terror-
ism, this understanding would have to wait for a signifi cant number of terrorist 
incidents to accumulate to provide a database suitable for testing. This is not a 
happy prospect.
2. This is not to say that the consequences of failure to price risk correctly are unin-
teresting or unimportant. Surely the credit default insurance industry of the past 
decade has had large negative economic effects, and so the “solution” to risk can 
itself result in a disaster event if that solution is unsound. These issues are beyond 
the scope of this paper, which assumes that insurance pricing is based on the latest 
and best estimates of risk.
3. See, for example, the recent discussion by Hakes and Viscusi (2007).
4. In this case proximity to a fault line was not indicated by insurance rates in ways 
that would make it apparent to home buyers. Indeed, the provision of earthquake 
insurance in California has been problematic for some time now for reasons that 
would easily justify an essay of considerable length.
5. The subsequent absence of a seismic event of any size proved embarrassing to the 
USGS, and there were threats of litigation by property owners.
6. The conclusion is somewhat more nuanced, as the authors fi nd that the higher growth 
rate postdisaster depends on the initial economic circumstances of the country.
7. A rise in disaster expectations lowers expected profi ts or raises insurance costs for 
fi rms, which then require compensation in the form of lower wages and/or lower 
rents. The same rise lowers indirect utility of households, and they require com-
pensation in the form of higher wages and/or lower rents. The change in wages is 
ambiguous but rents, and hence property values, must fall.
8. Specifi cally, they estimated a standard hedonic model for the logarithm of house 
value explained by a variety of housing characteristics standard in the literature but 
with area disasters added.
9. A disaster event is defi ned as one that resulted in a presidential disaster declara-
tion. The disaster variable is the number of disaster declarations in the previous 15 
years divided by 15 to produce an annual rate.
10. Recent attention to climate change may lead individuals to believe that the fre-
quency of disasters is changing. Whether this belief is scientifi cally valid or not, 
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those who hold it will be updating based on an underlying stochastic model that 
allows for drift. Further research on this possibility is warranted.
11. These statements are based on an implicit model in which the supply of terrorist 
acts is elastic. Models with a fi xed supply of terrorist events, such as those de-
scribed in Barker (2003), may result in different implications than those discussed 
in this paper.
12. For an extensive discussion see Congressional Research Service (1992).
13. See, for example, the analysis in Shilling, Benjamin, and Sirmans (1985).
14. Moral hazard arises in the form of the Samaritan’s dilemma. Individuals fail to 
insure or mitigate because they expect government postdisaster relief. Adverse 
selection problems occur if individuals with unrealistic expectations for disaster 
probabilities selectively migrate to hazardous areas. The time inconsistency prob-
lem arises when individuals believe that, by moving to a hazardous area, they 
can prompt public expenditures to mitigate the hazard by governments anxious to 
conserve on disaster relief cost. In other words, move onto the fl oodplain and the 
government will be forced to build a dam or levee at public expense.
15. Congestion in commuting is endogenous in this model. Given highway capacity, 
the model generates congestion based on the number of individuals choosing to 
commute through a particular segment of the city.
16. Chicago presents an interesting historical case because the portion of the city north 
of Lake Street is built on fi ll land that was created to realize the high social return 
of fi lling in the shore of Lake Michigan.
17. In addition to the standard arguments about excess development in high-risk ar-
eas already discussed, there is a more general literature on excess investment in 
real property, particularly second homes, based on the tax preference for owner-
occupied housing; see Poterba and Sinai (2008).
18. While the subsidy component of NFIP insurance for new construction is not large, 
the subsidy for existing units built before the insurance was implemented is very 
large. Furthermore, lenders are required to check for fl ood insurance in connec-
tion with mortgage servicing. Kriesel and Landry (2004) report survey evidence 
indicating that the participation rate is only 49 percent in spite of the mandate that 
mortgage servicers require evidence of insurance in force.
19. Evidence for the degree of risk aversion could be gleaned from portfolio behavior 
of households based on property ownership. It has been argued that perception of 
risk from hazards is selectively faulty or that households owning property in areas 
with high disaster probability are selected to be those who systematically under-
estimate the hazard.
20. Damages in interior areas may impede recovery and repair in shoreline areas as 
well as raise the cost of these activities.
21. Obviously, beach erosion can sometimes be zero or even negative, i.e., the beach is 
accreting. In such cases estimated erosion time is infi nite. The areas considered in 
this study are all beaches and subject to erosion. They are not protected by natural 
or man-made barriers. The potential for storm damage is substantial in these areas.
22. New construction was also subject to special construction requirements designed 
to raise vulnerable structures above fl ood surge levels.
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23. Note that there is an element of size needed even to qualify for a presidential di-
saster declaration.
24. To the extent that the object of terrorism is to produce the greatest economic dis-
location possible through the expectations effect, lowering the expectations effect 
reduces the returns to terrorism. 
25. For an early discussion of these issues along with an estimate of the wealth redis-
tribution effects of the NFIP, see Shilling, Sirmans, and Benjamin (1989).
26. The reclaimed land is then sold back to the private sector at a loss. Policy toward 
urban brownfi elds follows a similar pattern.
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